Check Fraud and the Variation of Section 4-401: Why Banks Should Not Be Able to Vary the UCC\u27s Standard Risk Allocation Scheme by Coutu, Michael
Boston College Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 1 Article 7
1-30-2013
Check Fraud and the Variation of Section 4-401:
Why Banks Should Not Be Able to Vary the UCC's
Standard Risk Allocation Scheme
Michael Coutu
Boston College Law School, michael.coutu@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Coutu, Check Fraud and the Variation of Section 4-401: Why Banks Should Not Be Able to Vary
the UCC's Standard Risk Allocation Scheme, 54 B.C.L. Rev. 275 (2013),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss1/7
CHECK FRAUD AND THE VARIATION OF 
SECTION 4-401: WHY BANKS SHOULD NOT 
BE ABLE TO VARY THE UCC’S STANDARD  
RISK ALLOCATION SCHEME 
Abstract: Uniform Commercial Code Article 4 governs both a bank’s du-
ties in collecting checks for payment as well as its duties to its depositors. 
Section 4-401 provides that a bank can charge an item to a customer’s ac-
count only if it is properly payable. For an item to be properly payable, it 
must be authorized by the customer. This Note examines the 2010 case, 
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Wachovia Bank, in which the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Minnesota stated that a bank can vary section 4-401’s 
default rule by including negotiated provisions in the deposit agreement. 
After exploring the structure and history of Article 4, this Note argues 
that banks should not be able to vary section 4-401’s default rule, and 
proposes that courts take into account the history of Article 4 when ana-
lyzing which default rules banks can vary through deposit provisions. 
Introduction 
 Frank Abagnale, one of the most prolific check forgers in U.S. his-
tory, once wrote, “I was a millionaire twice over and half again before I 
was twenty-one. I stole every nickel of it.”1 He started in 1964 at age six-
teen, and within five years managed to bilk banks and companies out of 
$2.5 million.2 Abagnale accomplished much of his fraud by producing 
checks that looked exactly like the payroll checks for Pan Am.3 Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC” or “Code”), Pan Am’s bank 
was forced to bear the losses from these fraudulent checks because they 
were not authorized by Pan Am.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 Frank W. Abagnale, Catch Me if You Can 4 (2000); Top 10 Imposters: Frank Abagnale, 
Time Lists, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1900621_1900 
618_1900788,00.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). 
2 Id. at 4–5, 21. 
3 Id. at 118–19. Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) was a major airline carrier dur-
ing the 1960s. Id. 
4 U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002) (providing that checks that are not properly payable cannot be 
charged to a customer’s account); id. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (providing that an unauthorized 
drawer’s signatures cannot be properly payable). 
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 The risk of loss for check fraud is governed by various provisions in 
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC.5 Article 3 governs negotiable instruments, 
of which checks are a subset.6 Article 4 provides a comprehensive set of 
rules for the check system among banks and for the collection of 
checks.7 Within this system, the UCC contains a standard risk allocation 
scheme that requires payment system providers (banks) to bear the risk 
of loss for fraudulent checks.8 Only in the case of user negligence can a 
bank seek to enforce a fraudulent check on a customer.9 
 The check system stipulates that the account holder is the drawer 
of a check on a bank, which is the drawee, that is made payable to a 
payee.10 To collect a check, Article 4 requires the payee to bring the 
check to a depositary bank to deposit it for a credit to the payee’s ac-
count.11 Then, the depositary bank either will present the check to the 
payor bank or will transfer it to an intermediary bank, which then will 
present it through a chain of collecting banks to the payor bank.12 The 
drawee bank, under Article 3, is also the payor bank, under Article 4, 
because it will make the decision whether to pay the check or dishonor 
it.13 The payor bank is also the depositary bank of the check’s drawer.14 
 In his book, Catch Me If You Can, Frank Abagnale described a 
scheme that he commonly used to defraud banks: 
I made myself, “Frank Williams,” the payee, of course in the 
amount of 568.10, a sum that seemed reasonable to me. In 
the lower left hand corner I type in “Chase Manhattan Bank” 
and the bank’s address. . . . Below the bank legend, across the 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. §§ 3-405, 3-406, 3-416, 4-401. 
6 Id. §§ 3-102, 3-104. 
7 Id. § 4-101 cmt. 1. 
8 Id. § 4-401 (providing that banks can charge their customers only for checks that are 
properly payable). 
9 Id. § 4-406(d). A customer who fails to exercise reasonable promptness in examining 
a statement will be precluded from asserting against the bank that there was (1) an unau-
thorized signature or alteration if the bank proves it suffered a loss by reason of the failure, 
and (2) the unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any item the 
bank paid in good faith before the bank received notice from the customer of the unau-
thorized item. Id. 
10 U.C.C. § 3-103(4) (2002) (defining “drawee” as the person ordered to make pay-
ment); id. § 3-103(5) (defining “drawer” as the person who signs ordering payment). 
11 See James Steven Rogers, The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Pay-
ment Systems Law Out of the Past 125–26 (2011). 
12 See id. 
13 U.C.C. § 4-402(c) (allowing a payor bank to determine a customer’s balance at any 
point between the time it receives the item and the time it returns the item as dishon-
ored). 
14 Id. § 4-401. 
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bottom left hand corner of the check, I laid down a series of 
numbers. . . . The numbers purportedly represented the Fed-
eral Reserve District of which Chase Manhattan was a mem-
ber, the bank’s FRD identification number and Pan Am’s ac-
count number. . . . I drove to the nearest bank, walked in 
jauntily and presented myself at a teller’s booth. . . . “Would 
you cash this check for me? I think that I have sufficient iden-
tification.”15 
In Abagnale’s example, Frank Williams is the payee, Pan Am is the 
drawer, and Chase Manhattan Bank is both the payor and drawee bank, 
where the check would ultimately be presented.16 When Frank signs 
the check in order to have the check cashed, that is Frank’s indorse-
ment.17 The teller, of course, cashed the forged check.18 
                                                                                                                     
 As Abagnale continued, his frauds became more complex and ex-
pensive.19 Abagnale eventually bought a real Pan Am payroll check 
from a flight attendant, brought it to a check printer, and ordered ex-
act duplicates of Pan Am checks.20 This example demonstrates the po-
tential costs of fraud in the check system—costs that banks are propos-
ing to transfer to their depositors via provisions placed in the deposit 
agreements.21 
 Article 4 of the UCC governs the relationship between a depositary 
bank and its depositor customer, including establishing who is liable for 
fraudulent and unauthorized checks.22 Section 4-401 provides that a 
depositary bank can only debit a customer’s account for a check if it is 
“properly payable.”23 Comment 1 to section 4-401 provides that any 
check that is not authorized by the drawer (alterations to the check are 
not authorized) is not “properly payable.”24 If the item is not properly 
 
15 Abagnale, supra note 1, at 118–20. 
16 See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(4), 4-105(3) (2002); Abagnale, supra note 1, at 118–20. 
17 See U.C.C. § 3-204(a) (providing that an indorsement is a signature on an instru-
ment meant to negotiate the instrument). 
18 Abagnale, supra note 1, at 119. 
19 See id. at 166–70. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 168–69. 
22 U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002). 
23 Id. (“An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in accor-
dance with any agreement between the customer and bank.”). 
24 Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (“An item containing a forged drawer’s signature or forged in-
dorsement is not properly payable.”). 
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payable, then the bank is not entitled to charge the item to the cus-
tomer’s account.25 
 The relationship between the depositor and its bank has always 
been considered a creditor-debtor relationship.26 Specifically, cases in-
terpreting the UCC historically have held that it was the bank’s duty to 
honor proper checks drawn upon it unless the bank had a right to re-
fuse the order by reason of another agreement.27 
 Over the years, banks have attempted to modify the UCC’s default 
rules in order to pass liability on to their depositors through provisions 
in their deposit agreements.28 Recently, banks have attempted to 
change the default rules of UCC section 4-401 by adding language to 
their customers’ deposit agreements.29 This practice has raised the 
question of whether banks may use these types of provisions to alter the 
default rules, and if so, to what extent.30 UCC section 4-103 provides 
that the UCC’s default rules may be varied by agreement so long as the 
bank does not disclaim ordinary care.31 This provision poses the ques-
tion of what the duty of ordinary care involves in the setting of a credi-
tor-debtor relationship.32 
 This issue was presented in the 2010 case, Cincinnati Insurance Co. 
v. Wachovia Bank, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minne-
sota.33 At issue in the case was whether Wachovia could charge back to 
its customer a check that had been altered.34 The court held that a pro-
vision in the deposit agreement that shifted liability onto the depositor 
                                                                                                                      
25 James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized Checks, 39 
Wake Forest. L. Rev. 453, 455 (2004). 
26 Tex. Commerce Bank-Hurst v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Tex. 1988); 
Mallett v. Tunnicliffe, 136 So. 346, 348 (Fla. 1931); Caledonia Nat’l Bank of Danville v. 
McPherson, 75 A.2d 685, 687 (Vt. 1950). 
27 Mallett, 136 So. at 349; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 687 (stating that according to the major-
ity of cases, the bank gives the depositor a right to draw on the credit). 
28 See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Habersham Cnty., 553 F.2d 398, 400 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (attempt to push liability on to the depositor for unauthorized checks that bore 
the facsimile signature); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wachovia Bank, No. 08-CV-2734, 2010 WL 
2777478, at *1 (D. Minn. July 14, 2010) (attempt to pass fraud losses to depositor if deposi-
tor did not pay for positive payment); Mercantile Bank of Ark. v. Vowell, 117 S.W.3d 603, 
612 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (attempt to limit the time depositors have to challenge unauthor-
ized items). 
29 See Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *4 (explaining the effects of positive pay-
ment on the default rules in section 4-401). 
30 See, e.g., Perini, 553 F.2d. at 400. 
31 U.C.C. § 4-103 (2002). 
32 See id. 
33 See Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *4 (explaining the effects of positive pay-
ment on the default rules in section 4-401). 
34 Id. at *1. 
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was enforceable.35 This outcome resembles that of our Frank Abagnale 
example—he was able to reproduce Pan Am checks without any negli-
gence on the part of Pan Am and yet, under the wording of the con-
tractual provisions, the liability would be shifted from the bank to the 
depositor (Pan Am).36 
 The Cincinnati Insurance holding has produced a legal dilemma: if a 
bank does not have to repay its depositor as directed, what is the rela-
tionship between the bank and depositor?37 Although section 4-103 
states that a bank can vary any provision within Article 4 by agreement 
of the parties so long as the bank does not disclaim ordinary care, the 
term “ordinary care” in the context of a depositor- or creditor-debtor 
relationship is not defined.38 There are two possible reasons for this re-
sult: (1) the Code’s drafters were looking at deposits in the context of 
the historical relationship of the depositor/creditor to the bank/debtor, 
or (2) most of Article 4 is concerned with the collection of checks, and 
part 4 of the Article was added to the old bank collection statutes with-
out considering how section 4-103 would relate to section 4-401.39 Both 
of these answers lead to the conclusion that section 4-103 should not be 
applied to vary what can be charged to a depositor’s account.40 
 This Note evaluates whether deposit agreement provisions that 
vary the properly payable rule in section 4-401 are enforceable.41 Part I 
discusses the history of Article 4, the standard risk allocation scheme, 
and the regulation of the relationship between a bank and its deposi-
tor.42 Part II provides context to the discussion by analyzing variations 
of other provisions in Article 4, and then compares them to the varia-
tion of section 4-401.43 Part III then argues that courts should not allow 
variation of section 4-401 because it is inefficient, undercuts the com-
mon law duties of banks, and was not meant to apply to section 4-401.44 
Part III also proposes that courts should give due regard to the histori-
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. 
36 Abagnale, supra note 1, at 166–70; see Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *1, *4. 
37 See Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *4; Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mal-
lett, 136 So. at 348; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 687. 
38 See U.C.C. § 4-103 (2002) (failing to define “ordinary care”). 
39 See Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mallett, 136 So. at 348; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 
687. 
40 See infra notes 302–346 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 46–346 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 46–123 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 124–190 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 191–346 and accompanying text. 
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cal duties of depositary banks when confronted with section 4-401 vari-
ation issues.45 
I. The History of Article 4: How the Uniform Commercial Code 
Became a Weapon for Banks 
 This Part provides a background of Article 4’s standard risk alloca-
tion scheme and the policies behind check fraud loss allocation, which 
is necessary to understand whether provisions that vary the default 
rules of section 4-401 are enforceable.46 Section A details the history of 
Article 4 and describes how its predecessor, the Bank Collection Act, 
affected its provisions and formation.47 Section B explains how Article 
4 establishes a standardized scheme for the allocation of losses due to 
fraudulent checks.48 Section C discusses the provisions that govern the 
relationship between a depository bank and its customers and the prob-
lem posed by the variation of section 4-401.49 
A. The History of Article 4 and Its Predecessor, the Bank Collection Act 
 Article 4 of the UCC came about primarily as a solution to the 
problems that existed in a national check collection system.50 Before 
the creation of Article 4, the law was unclear about the duties of a bank 
in the collection of checks.51 Different states had different standards 
for banks in collection.52 In some states, banks were considered agents 
of the depositor and were ultimately tasked with obtaining payment of 
the check for the depositor.53 If a collecting bank was an agent of the 
depositor, then, under agency law, the depositary bank was not liable to 
its account holder if it did not receive payment for the check due to a 
bank failure in the collection chain.54 Other states took the view that 
collecting banks were agents of the depositary bank, and therefore pro-
                                                                                                                      
45 See infra notes 191–346 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 65–123 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 50–64 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 65–95 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 96–123 and accompanying text. 
50 Rogers, supra note 11, at 131; John M. Norwood, Charge-Back Rights of Collecting 
Banks, 113 Banking L.J. 360, 361 (1996). 
51 Rogers, supra note 11, at 129; see Norwood, supra note 50, at 361. 
52 Rogers, supra note 11, at 129. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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vided depositary account holders with more rights against their bank if 
a problem in collection resulted in non-payment of a check.55 
 In the 1920s, the American Banking Association (“ABA”) began to 
support the creation of a uniform law for check collection procedures, 
which eventually became the ABA Bank Collection Code (“the ABA 
Code”).56 The ABA Code supported the Massachusetts rule, which 
viewed collecting banks as agents of the depositor.57 The ABA Code was 
ultimately defeated when numerous states refused to pass it into law be-
cause they felt that it was too favorable to banks.58 In the early 1950s, 
after the ABA Code’s defeat, a second effort to develop a uniform col-
lection code led to the creation of Article 4 of the initial UCC.59 
 At the time of the adoption of Article 4, there was significant de-
bate around whether the depositary bank should be liable for failure to 
receive payment due to a problem in collection.60 Harsh criticism came 
from a prominent commentator, Frederick Beutel, that Article 4 gave 
too much power to banks by allowing them to avoid liability for non-
payment due to a problem in collection.61 
 During the process of revising the ABA Code into Article 4 of the 
UCC, the drafters felt that it was necessary to include provisions gov-
erning the relationship between a bank and its customer.62 Almost as 
an afterthought, provisions governing the depositor-bank relationship 
were included as part IV of Article 4.63 Therefore, the provisions in part 
IV seem to be lumped into Article 4, without much thought as to the 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 130; Norwood, supra note 50, at 361. 
57 Rogers, supra note 11, at 130; Norwood, supra note 52, at 361 (stating that the ABA 
Code included a provision that the bank was the agent for the depositor in collection). 
58 See Rogers, supra note 11, at 131; Norwood, supra note 50, at 361 (noting that fewer 
than half the states adopted the ABA Code). The states’ concern was valid as it was the 
intent of the ABA Code to place the risk of loss for uncollected items on the customer. See 
Norwood, supra note 50, at 362. 
59 Rogers, supra note 11, at 131. 
60 See Rogers, supra note 11, at 131; Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Com-
mercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334, 360 (1952) (stating that proposed Arti-
cle 4 was too bank friendly and was in fact class legislation); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J. 364, 377 (1952) (agreeing with Pro-
fessor Frederick Beutel that if section 4-103, the provision that permits banks to vary the 
default rules, was not deleted, then Article 4 should not be adopted). 
61 Beutel, supra note 60, at 359–60. Conspicuously, Professor Grant Gilmore, who was 
strongly against section 4-103 because he felt it might completely diminish any responsibil-
ity a bank might have to a customer in collection, did not even mention the potential ef-
fect 4-103 might have on what is properly payable. Gilmore, supra note 60, at 376–77. 
62 Rogers, supra note 11, at 143–44. 
63 Id. 
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differences between the actions of payor banks on behalf of their cus-
tomers and those of collecting banks; this is apparent in the late addi-
tion of these provisions and the absence of common law duties of a 
bank to its customer in the provisions.64 
B. The Interplay Between Article 3 and Article 4: The Risk Allocation Scheme 
 Article 3 of the UCC governs negotiable instruments, of which 
checks are a subset, whereas Article 4 governs the collection of checks 
for payment and the duties of a bank to its customer.65 A bank’s cus-
tomer in this situation is the person who has a depository account at 
the bank.66 Although the customer will go to the bank in order to de-
posit checks, section 4-401 is concerned with checks that are drawn on 
a customer’s account and presented for payment.67 
 As noted in the Introduction, a customer who writes a check is the 
drawer of the check and the customer’s bank is the drawee.68 The pay-
ee will bring the check to his or her bank, which is both the depositary 
bank in the chain of collection as well as the payee’s depositary bank.69 
In order for the payee to obtain payment for the check, the payee’s de-
positary bank must forward the check through collection.70 Collection 
may, in the easiest manner, involve sending the check directly to the 
drawer’s bank.71 This scenario is common for major banking institu-
tions.72 For smaller banks that are distant from the payor bank, how-
ever, the path may be much more complicated with the check passing 
through multiple banks.73 Article 4 labels these intermediaries as col-
lecting banks.74 A collecting bank grants a provisional settlement credit, 
upon receipt of the check, to the previous bank in the chain.75 Ulti-
                                                                                                                      
64 See id.; see also Gilmore, supra note 60, at 376–77 (noting the ability of banks to con-
tract out of the statute via section 4-103 in collection, but not mentioning anything about 
the definition of properly payable). 
65 U.C.C. §§ 3-102, 4-102 (2002). 
66 Id. § 4-401. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. §§ 3-103(a)(5) (defining a “drawee” as a person ordered to make a payment), 3-
103(a)(6) (defining a “drawer” as a person who signs or orders payment); supra notes 15–
21 and accompanying text. 
69 Id. § 4-105 (defining a depositary bank as the first bank to take an item in collection). 
70 Id. § 4-201. 
71 See U.C.C. § 4-204 (2002) (stating that a collecting bank may send a check directly to 
a payor bank). 
72 See id. § 4-204 cmt. 2. 
73 See id. § 4-204(b). 
74 Id. § 4-105(5). 
75 Id. § 4-202. 
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mately, the check will be presented for payment to the payor bank, 
which is also the depositary bank of the check drawer.76 Unless the 
payor bank takes an affirmative action within the prescribed timeline, 
all the provisional settlements in the chain will become final.77 Errors 
in this collection process are what most of Article 4 is structured to gov-
ern and why Professors Frederick Beutel and Grant Gilmore were con-
cerned that Article 4 would enable banks to create a set of rules that 
would insulate them from any liabilities stemming from the collection 
chain.78 
 The interplay between Article 3 and Article 4 creates a standard 
risk allocation scheme whereby a payor bank will be liable for any 
forged indorsement unless it can show certain types of negligence 
committed by its depositary customer, the presumed drawer of the 
check.79 The UCC’s standard risk allocation system provides that the 
drawee bank is responsible for the loss due to a forged drawer’s signa-
ture, whereas the depositary bank is ultimately liable for a forged in-
dorser’s signature.80 Where only the amount of money on the check is 
altered, the drawee and payor bank can charge its customer for the 
amount originally authorized while the original depositary bank in the 
chain of collection will bear the risk of loss of the difference between 
the altered check and the original payment.81 Returning to the Frank 
Abagnale example, which involved an unauthorized drawer’s signature 
because Abagnale signed Pan Am’s facsimile signature onto the check, 
the payor bank, which was Pan Am’s bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
would have had to bear the loss.82 In contrast, had Abagnale stolen a 
check payable to Pan Am and indorsed the check as Pan Am, this 
would have constituted a forged indorsement, and thus the depositary 
bank in collection would have been liable.83 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. § 4-105(3) (defining “payor bank” as the bank that is the drawee of a check). 
77 U.C.C. § 4-215 (2002). 
78 Beutel, supra note 60, at 359–60; Gilmore, supra note 60, at 376–77; see U.C.C. § 4-
101 (indicating that the title of Article 4 is “Bank Deposits and Collections”). 
79 U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 3-406, 4-207, 4-208. 
80 Id. §§ 4-207, 4-208 (providing that transferring and presenting banks warrant that an 
instrument has no forged indorsements and that the draft has not been altered). The re-
sult, when combined with section 4-401, is that the depositary bank bears the loss for 
forged indorsements whereas the payor bank bears the loss for forged drawer’s signatures. 
See id. § 4-401; supra note 17 (defining “indorsement”). 
81 See U.C.C. §§ 4-208, 4-401. 
82 See id. §§ 3-103(5), 4-208; supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. 
83 See U.C.C. §§ 3-204(a), 4-207 (2002). 
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 Banks have defenses against their customers whose lack of ordi-
nary care causes a loss.84 Article 3, which governs the transfer and pay-
ment of checks as a subset of negotiable instruments, provides multiple 
defenses for banks in situations in which a customer may bear some of 
the blame for the loss.85 Section 3-405 provides that an employer can 
be responsible for the fraudulent indorsement of one of its employ-
ees.86 “[I]f [the] employer entrusted the employee with responsibility 
with respect to that type of instrument,” and the employee made a 
fraudulent indorsement, the indorsement is effective against the em-
ployer.87 If the party that paid value for the instrument failed to exer-
cise ordinary care, then a comparative negligence scheme determines 
th amages.e d
 a comparative negligence scheme 
 us
h substantially the same provisions and 
rot
                                                                                
88 
 If a party’s failure to exercise ordinary care contributes to the al-
teration of an instrument or the forging of a signature, then that party 
is precluded from bringing an action against the bank for repayment.89 
If the party arguing that the item should be precluded (in the usual 
case, it will be the payor bank against its creditor account holder) also 
failed to exercise ordinary care, then
is ed to determine the damages.90 
 Section 3-417 also provides a warranty for the payor bank for pay-
ing over forged instruments.91 If the payor bank pays a check that is 
unauthorized, then the payor bank can recover the damages that re-
sulted from the breach of warranty minus the amount that can be re-
covered from the drawer.92 Article 4 of the UCC provides a parallel war-
ranty for payor banks, wit
p ections as in Article 3.93 
                                      
 3-406, 3-416. 
partment who has access to the 
corp order to pay recurring bills. See id. 
2002). 
the warrantor has no 
kno awer’s signature is unauthorized. Id. 
84 Id. §§ 3-405, 3-406, 3-416. 
85 Id. §§ 3-405,
86 Id. § 3-405. 
87 Id. An example of an employee “with responsibility with respect to that type of in-
strument” would be an employee in an accounts payable de
orate checkbook in 
88 Id. § 3-405(b). 
89 U.C.C. § 3-406 (
90 Id. § 3-406(b). 
91 Id. § 3-417. Section 3-417 provides for a presentment warranty such that any person 
who obtains payment for the instrument warrants that the warrantor is a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument, that there have been no alterations, and that 
wledge that the dr
92 Id. § 3-417(b). 
93 See id. § 4-208(a)(1)–(4). 
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 By allowing banks to vary the provisions of Article 4 by agreement, 
section 4-103 threatens this default system.94 A bank, via deposit agree-
ments, is able to change the default rule that the users of the system 
w
the check 
s 
e is defined as the observance of reasonable com-
                                                                                                                     
ill be liable even for frauds to which they had no connection.95 
C. The Relationship Between the Depositor and the Bank and the Issues Posed 
by the Variation of Section 4-401 
 Before the adoption of the UCC, the relationship between a de-
positor and its bank was considered that of a creditor and debtor, with 
the depositor as creditor and the bank as debtor.96 Although there are 
differences from a typical creditor-debtor relationship, the depositor, as 
a creditor of the bank, is entitled to repayment as directed by the ac-
count holder.97 Therefore, prior to the UCC and section 4-401, case law 
had held that it was the bank’s duty to honor checks authorized by the 
drawer, unless it had a separate right not to pay the check.98 The pri-
mary right of the creditor-depositor is the ability to order the debtor-
bank to disburse funds to the depositor’s benefit.99 The bank cannot 
deduct funds from the account except with the authorization of the 
creditor-depositor.100 Returning to the Frank Abagnale example, let us 
assume that Abagnale had a valid payroll check from Pan Am that he 
deposited into his account at Chase Manhattan Bank.101 If 
wa ultimately paid, Abagnale would be entitled to repayment from the 
bank, usually in the form of a check drawn on his account.102 
 Article 4 of the UCC allows for its provisions to be varied by 
agreement so long as the bank does not disclaim good faith or ordinary 
care.103 Good faith is defined in section 3-103(a)(6) as both honesty in 
fact and observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing.104 Ordinary car
 
8, at *4 (explaining the effects of positive 
paym
594; Mallett, 136 So. at 348; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 687. 
2002). 
48; U.C.C. § 4-401. 
94 See Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 688. 
95 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 277747
ent on the default rules in section 4-401). 
96 Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 
97 See Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 688. 
98 See, e.g., Mallett, 136 So. at 349. 
99 Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594. 
100 See Cross v. Amoretti, 9 P.2d 147, 148 (Wyo. 1932). 
101 See Cross, 9 P.2d at 148; U.C.C. § 4-401 (
102 See Cross, 9 P.2d at 1
103 U.C.C. § 4-103(a). 
104 Id. § 3-103(a)(6). 
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mercial standards in the area with respect to the business in which the 
party is engaged.105 
 Banks, through recent developments in deposit agreements with 
their customers, have attempted to change the default rules in section 4-
401.106 One important change involves the banks’ development of posi-
tive payment programs for their customers.107 Positive pay systems help 
protect both the bank and the customer from fraudulent checks.108 Un-
der positive pay, customers submit the information of all their checks for 
the day (including the check number and amount) at the close of busi-
ness every day.109 For a monthly fee, the bank will then match the 
stem, the customer 
us
ree-
ment, a provision stipulated that if the customer rejected positive pay-
ment, then the customer would bear the risk of loss for fraudulent 
                                                        
checks presented for payment on the customer’s account with the in-
formation given by the customer.110 If the check presented for payment 
does not match the information given by the customer, then the bank 
will promptly dishonor the check as unauthorized.111 
 Following the development of positive payment systems, a bank 
could stipulate in its deposit agreement with its business customer that 
if a customer chose to reject the positive payment sy
m t accept liability for any forged item, including those for which the 
customer would not be liable under the standard rule.112 As a result, a 
legal question arose concerning whether the UCC risk allocation 
scheme could or should be varied by agreement.113 
 Positive payment presented an issue in the 2010 case, Cincinnati 
Insurance Co. v. Wachovia Bank, in which the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota held that the deposit agreement provision was 
enforceable.114 Wachovia wanted to charge back to its depositor, 
Schultz Foods, a check that had been altered.115 In the deposit ag
                                                              
nd Reverse-Positive 
Pay Check Fraud, 126 Banking L.J. 130, 131–32 
(2009) (describing how positive payment systems interact with Article 4). 
innati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *1. 
3. 
innati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *6. 
105 Id. § 3-103(a)(9). 
106 See Cincinnati Ins., 2010 WL 2777478, at *4. 
107 See id. at *1; see also Matthew R. Salzwedel, Toothless Tigers: Positive a
 and the Illusion of Customer-Loss Allocation for 
108 Cinc
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at *
114 Cinc
115 Id. at *1. 
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it s.em
 for all involved.122 Indeed, one of the main reasons for the last 
comprehensive update of Article 4, in 1990, was to minimize litiga-
tio
II.
                                                                                                                     
116 The court ultimately held that this provision was enforceable 
because it was not manifestly unreasonable under section 4-103.117 
 There are competing policy objectives on both sides of the issue of 
whether banks should be able to vary the properly payable standard.118 
Freedom of contract theory argues that banks and their customers 
should be able to price and allocate risk between them as they see fit.119 
Proponents of this theory argue that freedom of contract allows busi-
ness parties to allocate risk most efficiently.120 On the other hand, the 
UCC framework provides certainty for businesses such that both cus-
tomers and banks can depend on the same results in different states.121 
Furthermore, clear rules throughout the system serve to minimize liti-
gation between banks and their customers, reducing the costs of doing 
business
n.123 
Duties of a Depositary Bank to Its Customers Under UCC 
Article 4: Procedural versus Substantive Rights 
 Although litigation surrounding banks’ ability to vary section 4-401 
of the UCC using section 4-103 has only recently come through the 
courts, multiple analogies to other provisions in Article 4 and creditor-
debtor law are available.124 Time limitation provisions provide a contex-
tual distinction from provisions that alter 4-401 because they do not 
affect a depositor’s substantive rights.125 In comparison, facsimile 
agreements alter the default rule in 4-401 in a more subtle, limited, and 
 
116 Id. 
at the loss alloca-
tion
ariable standard, would allow 
part ontract for the most efficient allocation of risk). 
 Overby, supra note 118, at 361. 
supra note 118, at 361 n.63. 
d accompanying text. 
117 Id. at *7–8; see U.C.C. § 4-103 (2002). 
118 See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 879, 903 (2008) (stating that courts are comfortable assuming sufficient agreement 
when transactors acted as though they agreed); L. Ali Khan, A Theoretical Analysis of Payment 
Systems, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 425, 485 (2008) (arguing that banks are the best loss avoiders and are 
in a unique position to insure society); A. Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the 
Revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 351, 361 (2005) (stating th
 provisions promote finality and place the risk on the banking system). 
119 Christopher M. Grengs & Edward S. Adams, Contracting Around Finality: Transform-
ing Price v. Neal from Dictate to Default, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 202 (2004) (arguing that mak-
ing Price or section 4-401 a default rule, instead of an unv
ies to c
120 Id. 
121 See U.C.C. §§ 4-207, 4-208, 4-401 (2002);
122 See Overby, 
123 Id. at 386. 
124 U.C.C. § 4-103 (2002); see infra notes 130–139 an
125 See infra notes 130–139 and accompanying text. 
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less harmful manner than the more recent positive payment provi-
sions.126 Section A discusses banks’ attempts to vary the time reporting 
requirements for depositors to report unauthorized checks.127 Section 
B explains the use of facsimile provisions in deposit agreements and 
courts’ handling of such provisions.128 Section C distinguishes time re-
porting limitations from both facsimile agreements and positive pay-
men
hallenge in order to limit their liabil-
y.13
                                                                                                                     
t agreements.129 
A. The Ability to Vary the Section 4-406 Time Reporting Requirements 
 Banks have been successful in modifying the default provision in 
Article 4 that governs the period of time in which a customer may re-
port fraudulent activity to the bank, by inserting a provision in the 
bank’s deposit agreement.130 Article 4 provides that the customer has a 
year to report fraudulent activity from the time it appears on a bank 
statement.131 This provision exposes the bank to a relatively wide band 
of liability for unauthorized checks that a bank may have paid months 
before.132 Consequently, banks have tried to limit the period of time in 
which customers may bring a c
it 3 For the most part, banks have been successful in their efforts to 
limit the notification period.134 
 Some courts, however, have refused to permit banks to limit the 
notification period severely.135 For example, in the 2003 case, Crescent 
Women’s Medical Group, Inc. v. Keycorp, the Court of Common Pleas of 
 
ble is barred from asserting against the bank an unau-
tho
 
893
on-
cret
dulent checks to fourteen days is 
not
ion provision that was ambiguous 
and knowingly consent). 
126 See infra notes 140–155 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra notes 130–139 and accompanying text. 
128 See infra notes 140–155 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., Borowski v. Fristar Bank, 579 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
131 U.C.C. § 4-406(f) (2002) (providing that without regard to lack of care by either the 
customer or the bank, a customer who does not report fraudulent activity within a year 
after the statement is made availa
rized signature or alteration). 
132 See id.; see also James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code
 (6th ed. 2010) (stating that a short statute of limitations effectively disclaims liability). 
133 Mercantile Bank of Ark. v. Vowell, 117 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); C
e Materials Corp. v. Bank of Danville & Trust Co., 938 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Ky. 1997). 
134 See Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612 (enforcing a thirty-day limit); Concrete Materi-
als, 938 S.W.2d at 257 (suggesting that a sixty-day period is effective); Borowski, 579 N.W.2d 
at 252–53 (holding that altering the time to report frau
 manifestly unreasonable and therefore is effective). 
135 Crescent Women’s Med. Grp., Inc. v. Keycorp., 806 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl. 2003); see also Am. Airlines Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 991 S.W.2d 887, 896 
(Tex. App. 1999) (refusing to enforce a sixty-day limitat
 to which the customer did not 
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Ohio refused to enforce contractual provisions that limited the notifi-
cation period to fourteen days.136 The court reasoned that the fraud 
was on the indorsement of the check and stated that the UCC provides 
no duty for the customer to inspect such indorsements.137 Generally, 
courts have allowed a limitation of the notification period for banks’ 
customers so long as the limitation is not manifestly unreasonable.138 
Although the limitation might become manifestly unreasonable at 
some point, so long as the bank does not seek to limit the period to less 
than fourteen days, courts in most jurisdictions uphold the limitations 
as enfor
 to pay any 
                                                                                                                     
ceable.139 
B. The Ability to Vary Section 4-401 via Facsimile Agreements 
 The first movement by banks to avoid liability for paying checks 
that were not properly payable under section 4-401 involved facsimile 
agreements.140 Facsimile agreements vary the standard rules by stating 
that any check that bears a facsimile signature, or what appears to be a 
facsimile signature, will be charged to the depositor whether or not it 
was authorized.141 Facsimile agreements called for the bank
check presented to the bank that bore the company’s facsimile signa-
ture, whether or not the check was actually authorized.142 
 Perini Corp. v. First National Bank of Habersham County, a 1977 case 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, was one of the first 
cases to examine facsimile agreements.143 In Perini, someone gained 
 
cent, 806 N.E.2d at 205. 
hese clauses to the extent that they place the risk on the 
emp
ng that courts generally are willing to restrict a cus-
tom
 Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Habersham Cnty., 553 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 
197
any and the bank agreed that this signature would bind the 
com n the check. See id. 
136 Cres
137 Id. 
138 Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Putnal Seed & Grain, Inc., 
965 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a limitation of the time period 
in the deposit agreement to sixty days was enforceable); see also White & Summers, supra 
note 132, at 893 (supporting t
loyer for embezzlement). 
139 See, e.g., Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612 (enforcing a thirty-day limit); Putnal Seed 
& Grain, 965 So. 2d at 301 (upholding a limitation to sixty days); Stowell v. Cloquet Co-op 
Credit Union, 557 N.W.2d 567, 571–72 (Minn. 1997) (enforcing a twenty-day contractual 
period); Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 252–53 (upholding a fourteen-day limit); see also White & 
Summers, supra note 132, at 894 (stati
er’s time to give notice of errors). 
140 Perini
7). 
141 Id. A facsimile signature is a reproduction of a signature or symbol that authorizes 
payment. See id. In a facsimile agreement, check-writing equipment would produce a fac-
simile signature, and the comp
pany o
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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access to corporate check-writing equipment and used it to print unau-
thorized checks.144 The court held that the facsimile provision was en-
forceable and precluded the customer’s claims that the checks bore 
nau
rom at least one 
m
use it did not attempt to limit or negotiate liability, but was 
th
                                                                                                                     
u thorized signatures, because the checks did in fact bear the facsim-
ile signature.145 
 This concept has been expanded over the years.146 For example, 
the 1996 Louisiana Appeals Court case, Jefferson Parish School Board v. 
First Commercial Corp., involved a similar facsimile agreement.147 There, 
the court did not note how the checks were actually created.148 The 
court enforced the agreement, stating that although diligent bank per-
sonnel may have been able to notice the checks’ problems, the bank 
was entitled to enforce the agreement and thus was not liable to pay on 
the checks.149 This decision has come under criticism f
co mentator, who has noted that enforcing a clause like this shifts too 
much liability onto the users of the payment system.150 
 There have also been decisions that have held that facsimile 
agreements were not enforceable.151 In the 1997 case, Kaiser Aluminum 
& Chemical Corp. v. Mellon Bank, the bank lacked any evidence that its 
customer was negligent or failed to use ordinary care in its handling of 
the check equipment.152 There, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania stated that the facsimile clause was not enforce-
able beca
ra er a complete disclaimer of all liability, which was barred by section 
4-103.153 
 Similarly, in the 1981 case, Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Girard 
Bank, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
stated that because of its superior bargaining power, a bank, as a matter 
 
uld 
end
 was enti-
tled ge any checks that resembled the facsimile specimens. Id. 
d. at 1301. 
 24, 1997); Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 
414
1354, at *2. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 403. 
146 Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. First Commerce Corp., 669 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996); see also White & Summers, supra note 132, at 902 (stating that they wo
orse certain agreements that place the risk of a wrong signature on the depositor). 
147 Jefferson Parish, 669 So. 2d at 1300. The provision provided that the bank
 to honor and char
148 See i
149 Id. 
150 Rogers, supra note 25, at 485–86. 
151 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A 69-399, 1997 WL 
361354, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June
, 422–23 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
152 1997 WL 36
153 Id. at *5. 
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of law, cannot contractually absolve itself of all liability.154 The court 
went on to state that there is significant doubt as to the validity of an 
agreement that seeks to change the fundamental rules of liability set 
out
C. The Distincti ases from Time 
ies and 
differences between positive payment and facsimile cases, and argues 
. T
                                                                                                                     
 in Article 4.155 
on Between Positive Pay and Facsimile C
Limitation Cases: Why Positive Payment and Facsimile  
Agreements Should Not Be Enforceable 
 Courts have, for the most part, enforced both facsimile agree-
ments and time limitation provisions varying the default rules of Article 
4.156 The enforcement of facsimile agreements, like positive payment 
agreements, is problematic because it shifts liability from banks to their 
depositors.157 This Section first identifies the differences between posi-
tive payment systems and time limitation provisions in deposit agree-
ments, and then discusses how those differences result in differential 
treatment by courts.158 This Section then explains the similarit
that despite their differences, neither should be enforceable.159 
1 he Difference Between Positive Payment and Time Limitation 
Provisions 
 Although courts have been aggressive in upholding time limitation 
provisions in deposit agreements that vary the default rules of section 4-
406, courts should hesitate to take such an aggressive approach in cases 
in which the depositor’s substantive rights in default provisions of the 
UCC are varied, such as with positive payment provisions.160 In cases in 
which the deposit agreement contains a time limitation provision, the 
depositor’s substantive rights are not altered; instead, the customer 
must simply notify the bank in a more timely fashion.161 These cases do 
 
154 522 F. Supp. at 422–23. 
155 Id. 
156 See infra notes 160–168 and accompanying text. 
157 See infra notes 160–190 and accompanying text. 
158 See infra notes 160–168 and accompanying text. 
159 See infra notes 169–190 and accompanying text. 
160 See Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612; Concrete Materials, 938 S.W.2d at 257; Borowski, 
579 N.W.2d at 251. The time limitation rules can vary significantly, from the standard year 
to as little as fifteen days. See Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612; Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 
251. 
161 See U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002) (providing that the depositor has a year to notify the bank 
of unauthorized charges). 
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not raise issues about what the fundamental rights of the depositor are, 
but instead raise statute of limitations issues about how much time the 
epo
ly require that a business promptly and carefully inspect 
s s
re against 
fraud losses projected each year, and in turn, charge higher fees or of-
                                                                                                                     
d sitor retains claims; the depositor still has all the rights stipulated 
by the UCC.162 
 Although the time limitation provisions in deposit agreements may 
make it more difficult for businesses to take advantage of their rights, 
so long as they adhere to good business practices, they should have 
ample time to notify the bank of an unauthorized payment.163 These 
provisions simp
it tatements in order to determine if there has been a fraudulent 
transaction.164 
 Furthermore, there is a significant public policy benefit in limiting 
the notification period, because a shorter notification period allows 
banks to more easily protect against losses due to fraud.165 Fraud losses 
often occur because a fraudster has gained access to a corporate ac-
count and continues to write checks over a period of months or even 
years.166 Shortened notification times encourage quick reporting to the 
bank, which then can flag the account and look more carefully for po-
tentially suspicious activity.167 The reduction of fraud losses for banks 
benefits all depositors because banks must effectively insu
fer lower interest rates to depositors to offset fraud losses.168 
 
162 See id. §§ 4-401, 4-406. 
163 See Borowksi, 579 N.W.2d at 251–53 (holding that a fourteen-day time notification 
limit was not manifestly unreasonable). In most cases, the business will have more than two 
weeks to respond to the unauthorized charge. See, e.g., Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612 
(thirty days); Concrete Materials, 938 S.W.2d at 257 (sixty days). 
164 See Mercantile Bank, 117 S.W.3d at 612. 
165 See Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 252 (describing the limiting of litigation as a valuable 
goal of a banking system in which there are millions of transactions every day). 
166 See U.C.C. § 4-406(d) (providing that a customer is precluded from asserting an 
unauthorized signature if the bank proves that it suffered a loss because of the customer’s 
failure to inspect). Comment 2 of section 4-406 makes clear that the UCC’s drafters were 
worried about the possibility of multiple frauds being perpetrated by the same person on 
the same account. See id. § 4-406 cmt 2. 
167 See U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 2 (2002). 
168 See id. (stating that the best way to protect against multiple fraud losses is for the 
customer to examine the statement promptly and notify the bank of an unauthorized sig-
nature). 
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2. The Distinction Between Positive Payment Agreements and 
Facsimile Signature Agreements 
 Although they both vary section 4-401’s default rule by agreement, 
facsimile agreements do not have as harmful an effect as positive pay-
ment agreements because many of the cases they govern are those in 
which the UCC would otherwise preempt the depositor’s right to bring 
 su 169a it to recredit the account.  Facsimile provisions in depositor 
agreements provide that any item presented for payment to the bank 
bearing the facsimile signature or one resembling the facsimile signa-
ture will be paid by the bank.170 The bank then has the power under 
the agreement to deduct the amount from the depositor’s account 
even if an item was not technically authorized by the depositor.171 
 There are three types of transactions that these agreements could 
govern in which the item would not otherwise be authorized.172 In the 
first situation, an employee attains access to his or her company’s fac-
simile and check-printing capabilities and writes checks that are not for 
he b 173t enefit of the company.  In the second situation, a fraudster gains 
access to the corporate check account because of some negligence on 
the part of the corporation; in the third, the fraudster does not gain 
access to the machine but instead receives a check, and, using modern 
technology, reproduces a similar-looking check bearing a signature ei-
ther equivalent or nearly equivalent to the facsimile.174 
 The first situation is not problematic because in a majority of such 
cases, the employer would be precluded from bringing an action 
against the bank to recredit its account due to provisions that hold the 
employer responsible if it is within the employee’s job responsibilities 
                                                                                                                      
n Perini, the exact provision at issue, 
calle orate resolution, authorized the banks to “honor all checks . . . in the name of 
Peri Regular Accounts . . . when bearing or purporting to bear the 
sing  honor and 
char
not have been able to 
show  the other party. 669 So. 2d at 1299. 
169 See id. § 3-405 (providing that a forged signature is effective against an employer if 
the employer entrusted the employee with responsibility to that type of instrument); id. 
§ 3-406 (providing that if a party is negligent and the negligence substantially contributes 
to a forged signature, the party is preempted from challenging the signature). 
170 See, e.g., Perini, 553 F.2d at 400. For example, i
d a corp
ni Corporation on its 
le facsimile signature of R.A. Munroe. . . . Said banks shall be entitled to
ge Perini Corporation for all such checks.” Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See U.C.C. § 4-401. 
173 Perini, 553 F.2d at 400; see infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
174 Rogers, supra note 25, at 485–86; see infra notes 179–190 and accompanying text. 
For example, in Jefferson Parish, the court noted that the bank would 
 negligence on the part of
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to make payments.175 Article 3 provides multiple preemption rules, 
many of which focus on the employer setting and preclude an em-
ployer from suing the bank if the employer bears some responsibility 
for the fraudulent item.176 If the employer had entrusted an employee 
with responsibility for that type of instrument, then that employee’s 
fraudulent indorsement cannot be raised against a person who paid 
alu
luded from asserting the forgery against a 
art
                                                                    
v e for the instrument.177 Therefore, if it was an employee who nor-
mally had access to the checkwriter in order to write payroll checks, 
then the company could not argue that the check was unauthorized 
because the bank took it for the purpose of collection.178 
 The second situation involves a company’s negligence with respect 
to proper protection of the company’s facsimile machine and corpo-
rate checks; if a company is negligent, it would not be able to assert that 
the check was unauthorized.179 This situation is broader than the en-
trusted employee scenario because there is no limitation on who perpe-
trated the fraud.180 Here, the only necessary showing is that the corpo-
ration negligently supervised its corporate checking account.181 Article 
3 provides that someone who substantially contributes to the making of 
a forged instrument is prec
p y who has taken the instrument for collection.182 Therefore, if a 
company has been negligent in the supervision or protection of its cor-
porate checking account, the bank would not be liable if there is an 
unauthorized signature.183 
 The variation of section 4-401 posed by facsimile signatures is pre-
sented in the third scenario, in which the fraudster does not gain access 
to the corporate checking account due to negligence, but instead is 
able to replicate company checks with an accurate facsimile.184 The 
UCC’s default rule is clear in this situation: these are unauthorized 
items for which a bank cannot charge its depositor, and the bank must 
                                                  
175 See U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 3-406 (2002); see also Rogers, supra note 25, at 490–91 (arguing 
that in an insider fraud case, the facsimile agreement is of negligible value because the 
com cluded from bringing the claim for repayment). 
 §§ 3-405, 3-406. 
 3-406. 
d. 
n 3-406 would apply in this 
scen ormally would be obligated to recredit the depositor’s ac-
cou 05, 3-406, 4-401. 
pany will be pre
176 U.C.C.
177 Id. § 3-405. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. §
180 See id. 
181 See i
182 U.C.C. § 3-406 (2002). 
183 Id. 
184 See id. §§ 3-405, 3-406. Neither section 3-405 nor sectio
ario, and thus the bank n
nt in the amount of the item. See id. §§ 3-4
2013] Check Fraud & the UCC's Standard Risk Allocation Scheme 295 
b  the loss.ear
nder pre-UCC 
common law, the duty for the bank was one of a creditor to its debtor, 
posit ent 
ad 
.193 Section C argues that section 4-
103 was not originally intended to apply to section 4-401 and that it 
                                                                                                                     
185 This is a situation in which the facsimile provision 
changes the default rule of the UCC and thus is essentially the same as 
the situation caused by positive payment waivers; unauthorized checks 
that are not the result of the company’s negligence would be charged 
to the company’s account.186 
 This third scenario is ultimately the same as situations caused by 
positive payment, because positive payment provisions are designed to 
cover all unauthorized checks.187 If section 4-401 can be altered through 
section 4-103 without disclaiming ordinary care, there is little left to the 
depositor-bank relationship because the bank does not have a complete 
obligation to repay for the benefit of the depositor.188 U
such that once the deposit was entered into the bank’s books, the de-
or was entitled to a creditor’s right to repayment.189 The repaym
h to be made to the creditor, and not to another party, unless ex-
pressly designated and made on behalf of the creditor.190 
III. Why Variation of Section 4-401 Should Not Be Allowed and 
How Courts Should Handle Article 4 Variation Issues 
 Banks should not be allowed to vary section 4-401 of the UCC by 
agreement with their depositors; banks’ historical duty to their deposi-
tors is to repay debt as directed by the depositors, and varying this duty 
destroys any contractual duty the bank may have to its depositors.191 
Section A of this Part describes theories that analyze the efficiency of 
varying section 4-401 and argues that not allowing variation is the most 
efficient.192 Section B discusses the common law duty of a depositary 
bank to its customer and argues that allowing the bank to vary this duty 
results in a nonsensical paradigm
 
69 So. 2d at 1299. 
nited States, 703 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Tex. 
198
herson, 75 A.2d 685, 687 (Vt. 1950). 
8; Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 
687. 
 So. at 348. 
185 Id. §§ 3-405, 3-406. 
186 See Jefferson Parish, 6
187 See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wachovia Bank, No. 08-CV-2734, 2010 WL 2777478, at *4 
(D. Minn. July 14, 2010). 
188 See Tex. Commerce Bank-Hurst v. U
8); Mallett v. Tunnicliffe, 136 So. 346, 348 (Fla. 1931); Caledonia Nat’l Bank of Danville 
v. McP
189 Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. 592 at 594; Mallett, 136 So. at 34
190 See Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp at 594; Mallett, 136
191 See infra notes 196–346 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra notes 196–272 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 273–301 and accompanying text. 
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sh r 
courts ks in 
lle
ent system 
providers, as support for why banks should not be able to vary the stan-
 
co he risk 
f lo
 over it, and 
us
and took the item in good faith are entitled to payment.203 
                                                  
ould not currently.194 Finally, Section D proposes a solution fo
 to retain the meaning of section 4-103 for the duties of ban
co ction while still not allowing banks to vary their traditional duties 
to depositors embodied in section 4-401.195 
A. Theories Relating to Risk Allocation in the Check System and Why Strict 
Liability or No Variation of Section 4-401 Is Economically Efficient 
 Theories relating to check loss, payment systems, and commercial 
transactions aid the development of commercial law by helping it pro-
vide a beneficial system for the transactions it regulates.196 First, this 
Section discusses the theories of finality and banks as paym
dard risk allocation.197 Second, this Section explains how freedom of
ntract theory supports banks’ ability to negotiate who bears t
o ss.198 Third, this Section argues that it is economically efficient to 
stipulate in Article 4 that section 4-401 may not be varied.199 
1. Theories Supporting No Variation: Finality and the Idea That Banks 
Should Bear the Risk of Loss as the Payment System Provider 
 If section 4-401 and the risk allocation provisions in Article 4 can-
not be varied, then the Code provides for stable rules and expectations 
on which businesses can depend.200 Finality is the idea that once a 
transaction has occurred, there should be minimal debate
th  minimal litigation.201 Finality promotes easy allocation of the loss 
without litigation, thereby realizing a main policy goal of the UCC: 
minimizing litigation.202 The finality rule draws support from Article 3, 
which governs negotiable instruments, because people who paid value 
                                                                    
nying text. 
tes 235–253 and accompanying text. 
 Overby, supra note 118, at 361 n.63. 
 and for value or who changed his or her posi-
tion rawee will not have an 
 
194 See infra notes 302–326 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 326–346 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra notes 196–272 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra notes 200–234 and accompa
198 See infra no
199 See infra notes 254–272 and accompanying text. 
200
201 Id. at 361. 
202 U.C.C § 1-103(a)(1) (2002) (stating that the goal of the UCC is clarity and simplic-
ity). 
203 See id. § 3-418. Section 3-418(c) provides that there are no remedies against a per-
son who took an instrument in good faith
 in reliance on the payment. Id. § 3-418(c). In this case, the d
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 Finality in payment encourages commercial transactions and can 
provide stability to the commercial system.204 Finality was a traditional 
justification for drawee liability, and it promotes a positive business en-
vironment by allowing businesses to close transactions quickly and effi-
c tly.ien
ross different payment 
ste
                                                                             
205 The first edition of the Restatement of Restitution expressly 
supported this view and stated that a rule of finality in negotiable in-
struments would allow “mercantile instruments in situations where or-
dinarily it is reasonably possible for the payor to ascertain the fraud.”206 
 For finality to operate properly, liability must be placed squarely on 
one party or another party in a quasi-strict liability scheme in order to 
minimize litigation.207 Some commentators have argued that banks 
should bear the risk of loss because, as the payment system providers, 
there are significant policy incentives for them to do so.208 Placing the 
risk of loss on banks provides a strong incentive for the banks to de-
velop new technologies and procedures to minimize potentially avoid-
able losses that occur due to check fraud.209 Ac
sy ms, the law is relatively uniform in that the risks of unavoidable 
losses (losses that are not due to negligence of any party) from unau-
thorized payments are borne by the provider and that these provisions 
cannot be varied by agreement of the parties.210 
 Placing liability on banks for the unavoidable losses from fraud 
conforms to all of the other modern payment systems.211 The main 
principle of modern payment systems is that payment system provid-
ers—generally the banks or financial institutions that provide for the 
processing of the payment—bear the cost of the unavoidable loss due 
to fraud.212 The providers then spread the risk across the system, 
through customer or merchant fees, in order to insure against exten-
sive losses due to fraud.213 For example, the regulations for the credit 
                                         
action against the person paid because there usually is a person who took the check in 
goo  for value. See id. 
tatement (First) of Restitution § 30 cmt. a (1937). 
t of loss reduction if a 
fina rguing that 
ban able loss due to check fraud). 
 & Rubin, supra note 208, at 106; Overby, supra note 118, at 361. 
 supra note 25, at 454. 
d. 
d faith and
204 Res
205 See id. 
206 Id. 
207 Overby, supra note 118, at 361 n.63. 
208 Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Pay-
ments, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 63, 106 (1987) (noting the innovation elemen
ncial institution is subject to liability); Rogers, supra note 25, at 463–67 (a
ks should bear the risk of unavoid
209 Cooter
210 Rogers,
211 See i
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
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card system, which address the relationships between the user, issuer, 
merchant, and network, provide that so long as the user notifies the 
issuing bank (the system provider) in an adequate amount of time, the 
user’s maximum liability for unauthorized fraudulent charges is only 
fifty dollars.214 
 Similarly, the debit card system, which governs the procedures and 
liabilities between the parties involved in processing debit card pay-
ments, provides a maximum liability scheme with the lowest ceiling of 
$50 escalating to $500 or more depending on the timeliness of the cus-
tomer’s response.215 In the debit card system, if the customer does not 
report the unauthorized transfer within sixty days, the bank does not 
have to reimburse losses that would not have occurred if the customer 
ave
sonable security procedure and the bank follows the security procedure 
     
g  timely notice.216 As in the credit card system, in the debit card sys-
tem if the customer reports in a timely manner, the customer’s liability 
is capped at fifty dollars.217 This is the only manner in which a customer 
may be held liable for unauthorized charges on its account.218 Con-
sumer electronic funds transfers are also governed by these rules.219 
 Even the wire transfer system, which governs the rights and obliga-
tions of both customers and fulfilling banks, and is designed primarily 
for business-to-business transactions, has rules designed to allocate the 
risk of unavoidable loss to the system provider.220 Banks bear the risk of 
loss unless the customer is at fault.221 If a payment order—an order di-
recting a bank to make payment—was not authorized by the customer, 
the bank is not entitled to enforce the order unless the customer made 
an external mistake.222 The bank can hold the customer liable for the 
payment order only if the bank and the customer have agreed to a rea-
                                                                                                                 
214 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1643 (2006)). 
215 Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(1) (2006) (stating that 
a co
r Unauthorized Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2012). 
iding that if the consumer notifies the bank within two busi-
nes
. EFTA and Regulation E, promulgated pursuant to EFTA, govern con-
sum
ing bank can only enforce the order if the order was made by a per-
son
ntrolled by the customer. Id. 
nsumer’s liability for an unauthorized transfer exceeds the lesser of fifty dollars or the 
amount of money obtained in such unauthorized fund transfers prior to notification). 
216 Id.; see Liability of Consumer fo
217 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (prov
s days after learning of the loss or the theft of an access device, then the customer’s 
liability will not exceed fifty dollars). 
218 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(e). 
219 Id. § 1693g(a)
er electronic funds transfers, of which debit cards are included. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b). 
220 U.C.C. § 4A-201 to -203 (2002). 
221 Id. § 4A-203. 
222 Id. The receiv
 entrusted with a duty for security procedures or payment orders or who obtained ac-
cess to the customer’s transmission from a source co
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in making the order.223 These rules are stipulated even though fraud 
loss presents a massive problem for the wire transfer system because, 
nlik
tent to which 
 is 
sses.233 Therefore, 
there is a strong argument that placing the liability for unavoidable 
ven eoretically decreasing costs for everyone through 
we
u e other payment systems, wire transfers handle uniquely large 
amounts of money per order.224 In fact, due to their reliability and fast 
finality, wire transfers account for about eighty-five percent of all money 
passing through payment systems.225 
 Article 4A of the UCC, governing wire transfers, ultimately pro-
vides that the rules governing the risk of loss cannot be varied by 
agreement.226 Section 4A-202, which governs the liability of customers 
on their transfer orders, allows only a minimal amount of variation, 
stating that the provision can be varied only to the extent provided for 
in section 4A-203(a)(1).227 Section 4A-202(b) provides that a bank and 
customer can agree on a certain security procedure.228 Section 4A-
203(a)(1) provides that a receiving bank can limit the ex
it entitled to enforce or retain payment of the payment order by writ-
ten agreement with the customer.229 These rules effectively put the 
emphasis on security and encourage all parties to maintain their secu-
rity procedures in order to reduce fraud loss in the system.230 
 There is a strong argument that if payment systems have to bear 
the risk of unavoidable losses, then the system providers will be incen-
tivized to develop new technology and procedures to minimize the 
risk.231 The median cost of fraud prevention services for money center 
banks in 2004 was between $5 and $20 million, not counting the cost of 
losses from fraudulent checks.232 Banks spend a substantial amount of 
money in an attempt to protect the system against lo
losses on banks has produced an effort by the banks to step up the pre-
tion of fraud, th
lo r customer fees and fewer fraudulent losses.234 
                                                                                                                      
223 Id. § 4A-202. 
224 Id. § 4A prefatory note (stating that the dollar value of payments made by wire 
tran ethod). 
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.C. § 4A-202(f) (2002). 
-203(a)(1). 
ngs & Adams, supra note 118, at 184 n.161. 
sfers far exceeds any other payment m
225 Rogers, supra note 25, at 476–7
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231 Overby, supra note 118, at 361. 
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2. Freedom of Contract: A Theory Supporting Varying Section 4-401 by 
Agreement 
 Freedom of contract principles support the ability of customers and 
their banks to vary the provisions of the UCC in order to allocate risk 
between the parties as they choose.235 Commentators argue that allow-
ing parties to allocate the risk of loss as they choose will lead to the bur-
den of the loss falling on the party that can most adequately bear it.236 
 This theory is analogous to Judge Learned Hand’s theory outlined 
in the 1947 case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.237 The case involved the question 
of who should bear the loss in the crash and sinking of a towboat due to 
negligence by the defendant.238 Judge Hand reasoned that whether a 
duty existed for the defendant to prevent the plaintiff’s loss could be 
determined by an equation that included: (1) the probability (P) that 
the boat will break away; (2) the seriousness of the possible loss (L) if it 
did break away; and (3) the burden (B) of adequate protections, shown 
in the formula B<PL.239 Liability is incurred by a potentially negligent 
defendant when the probability of the harm occurring multiplied by 
the cost of the harm is greater than the burden of the adequate protec-
ion.240t  According to this formula, if the burden of the protection is 
greater than the calculated potential harm, then the defendant either 
has no duty or has satisfied the duty of care and the victim must bear 
the cost of damage.241 This calculation is merely another way to deter-
mine the party who can most efficiently prevent and insure against the 
risk of loss.242 
 With Judge Hand’s theory in mind, theories have since been de-
veloped to allocate risk in the most efficient ways in other areas of the 
law, not traditionally thought to have economic policy rationales.243 For 
example, one theory suggests that, for business accounts in the check 
                                                                                                                      
9, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
t 170. 
73. 
.J. 499, 503 (1961); Adam Candeub, An Economic 
The
235 Id. at 164. 
236 Id. 
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239 Id. at 1
240 Id. 
241 See id. 
242 See id.; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 167 (7th ed. 2007). 
243 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 242, at 167; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Dis-
tribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L
ory of Criminal Excuse, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 87, 90–91 (2009) (applying Judge Hand’s theory 
to the availability of criminal excuses). 
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system, it might be more efficient for the customer to bear at least some 
of the risk of loss for fraudulent checks.244 
 Professor Ronald Coase’s famous theory of social costs is relevant 
to the issue of whether it would be efficient to allow banks and their 
customers to vary the risk allocation scheme.245 Professor Coase has 
argued that whether or not liability is structured by the law, the costs to 
society will be the same.246 He uses the example of a farmer and a 
herder to demonstrate that, in a perfect market, the market will price 
in the liability in order to reach the same result.247 He ultimately argues 
k to work to reduce fraud to the extent that the costs of com-
tin
ause the banks as system 
providers spread the artificially high costs of the system, due to the at-
nks 
to provisions of section 4-401 could lead to lower transaction 
that legal and economic commentators, when looking to social policy, 
should use an opportunity cost analysis to determine the social benefits 
and costs of different structures, much like economists apply in the 
firm context.248 
 Professor Coase’s theory and analysis can be used to demonstrate 
that a strict allocation of risk among the banks provided for in Article 4 
is not efficient because costs to the banks within this structure are 
greater than the corresponding social costs.249 It is only efficient for the 
payor ban
ba g fraud are lower than the costs of the fraud itself.250 Further-
more, it is even more inefficient because banks are forced to work on 
fraud prevention, something for which they are neither well suited nor 
efficient.251 
 Others have argued that banks are inefficient at detecting fraud, 
and thus the social costs are actually higher bec
tempts to prevent fraud, across the entire user base.252 Allowing ba
vary the 
costs for banks and a more efficient system.253 
                                                                                                                      
244 Calabresi, supra note 243, at 551; see also Posner, supra note 242, at 11 (defining ef-
ficiency as the allocation of resources in which value is maximized). 
245 Grengs & Adams, supra note 118, at 188–89; see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 7–8 (1960). 
246 Coase, supra note 245, at 7–8. 
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250 See Grengs & Adams, supra note 118, at 189. 
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252 See id. at 193; see also Posner, supra note 242, at 6 (defining social cost as a cost that 
diminishes the wealth of society). 
253 Grengs & Adams, supra note 118, at 201. 
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3. A Theoretical Argument Supporting a Standard Risk Allocation 
Scheme 
 A strict liability regime for banks bearing unavoidable fraud losses 
from paying unauthorized checks provides for finality within the system 
and allows for parties to move on quickly following the challenge of an 
unauthorized check.254 A standard rule would minimize litigation be-
cause there would not be questions as to whether provisions such as 
facsimile or conditioned positive payment are enforceable as variations 
of section 4-401.255 Furthermore, finality allows both sides to depend 
on standard rules, and thus provides adequate protection in case some-
thing goes wrong.256 Without clarity, it is possible that one party could 
e ub nderinsured, or alternatively that both parties would insure against 
the loss, resulting in an over-insured society and an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources.257 Between the clarity and finality of the strict liability 
rule, the result of the nonvariability will be increased efficiency within 
the banking system and the greater economy.258 This is because re-
sources are allocated such that value is maximized.259 
 Strict liability would benefit the check system because after the 
check is paid by the payor bank, the account holder no longer can chal-
lenge the result of the transaction.260 The payor’s bank has at least 
some measure of control over determining whether the item is actually 
uth 261a orized.  This is similar to a contractual situation in which the 
promisor is in a better position to stop the harm, making strict liability 
appropriate.262 Holding banks strictly liable encourages them to de-
velop new technologies to detect check fraud, such as, for example, by 
using electronic presentment with applicable images of the checks 
along with a technology that could detect alterations.263 
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prevents firms from 
dete ch they should invest to prevent accidents). 
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e in contractual situations be-
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 at 106; Overby, supra note 118, at 361. 
254 See Overby, supra note 118, at 361 n.63. 
255 See U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002); Posner, supra note 242, at 180 (providing t
ity in tort makes litigation simpler and thus leads to lower litigation costs). 
256 Overby, supra note 118, at 361 & n.63; see Posner, supra note 242, at 185. 
257 See Posner, supra note 242, at 185 (providing that uncertainty 
rmining how mu
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259 Id. 
260 See id. at 182 (stating that strict liability is appropriat
se the promisor is in a better position to stop the harm). 
261 See Rogers, supra note 11, at 140 (noting t
centage of the items are manually inspe
262 See Posner, supra note 242, at 182. 
263 See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 208,
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 Strict liability could also limit the number of claims leading to liti-
gation, thereby decreasing costs throughout the system, because claims 
would be easier to settle with a clear rule.264 Even the claims that do not 
ac
anually inspecting every item, 
but this would result in increased employment costs to save on fraud 
historically lent items, 
d 
included in an analysis of the variability of section 4-401 and discusses 
how that duty affects the analysis.274 This Section then argues that 
                                                                                                                     
re h litigation would proceed with fewer contested issues because 
strict liability would have eliminated some claims, thereby limiting the 
average cost per case.265 This combination of efficiencies should lower 
overall litigation costs and provide an economic gain.266 It would also 
permit the most efficient allocation of resources throughout society.267 
 It has been argued that strict liability would be too harsh on banks 
because they lack the resources necessary to inspect every check manu-
ally.268 This argument, however, beckons the answer.269 Banks have 
made the economic and fiscal choice not to inspect all items manually, 
unless they are above a certain dollar amount, because it is less expen-
sive for them to later recredit accounts for fraudulent items.270 Pre-
sumably, banks could reduce fraud by m
expenses.271 Therefore, the argument is a red herring as banks have 
been held strictly liable for the payment of fraudu
an thus the benefits of a form of strict liability outweigh the dangers of 
the costs placed on depositary banks.272 
B. The Payor Bank and Its Customer: Why Allowing Variation of Section 4-401 
Disclaims the Bank’s Historical Duties to Its Customer 
 The common law duty of a depositary bank to repay its creditor 
informs how courts should interpret depositary provisions, which at-
tempt to limit the depositary bank’s liability for unauthorized checks.273 
This Section first argues that the common law duty of banks must be 
 
ner, supra note 242, at 180. 
noting that it is rare for banks to inspect items 
man e modern banking system). 
ting that businesses will deter the 
risk 
 note 11, at 140. 
264 See Pos
265 See id. 
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267 See id. 
268 See Grengs & Adams, supra note 118, at 200. 
269 See Rogers, supra note 11, at 140 (
ually in th
270 See id. 
271 See id.; see also Posner, supra note 242, at 167 (sta
of loss only to the extent that it makes fiscal sense). 
272 See Posner, supra note 242, at 167; Rogers, supra
273 See infra notes 274–301 and accompanying text. 
274 See infra notes 277–292 and accompanying text. 
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courts have ignored banks’ common law duty and have thereby been 
led off track by both the technical language of section 4-401 and the 
perspective that the bank always wins.275 Finally, this Section discusses 
 
ba y agreement.276 
 the bank.277 The pre-UCC 
w 
ractual right to pay-
     
how courts’ neglect of the common law duties of banks has increased
nks’ ability to vary their duties b
1. The Common Law Duty of Banks and How It Affects the Analysis of 
the Variability of Section 4-401 
 The historical relationship between a bank and its depositor is 
clear: the money deposited into a bank became the property of the 
bank and the depositor became a creditor of
la was that a bank could charge a customer’s account only for an au-
thorized order by the account holder, which set off the bank’s debt to 
the customer by the amount of the order.278 
 A bank’s duties are fundamentally those of a debtor, and thus it is 
within the creditor-debtor setting that the phrase “lack of ordinary 
care” must be analyzed.279 The bank has the duty to repay the debt on 
demand.280 Demand is made through instruments that are authorized 
by the account holder.281 In this situation, it does not make sense in the 
abstract for the bank to be able to charge an item to an account with-
out authorization.282 A bank deducting money from a customer’s ac-
count for an unauthorized charge is analogous to a debtor missing a 
payment to a creditor.283 In the standard case of missing a payment to a 
creditor, the creditor will seek to enforce its cont
                                                                                                                 
275 See infra notes 293–301 and accompanying text. 
276 See infra notes 293–301 and accompanying text. 
, 594 (N.D. Tex. 1988); 
Mal t’l Bank of Danville v. 
McP
o. at 349. 
ould be no question that a payment made to some other unrelated third 
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 to the extent payment is made to a person entitled to enforce the 
instr
d. § 4-401 (stating that accounts can only be charged for items that are properly 
pay
277 Tex. Commerce Bank-Hurst v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 592
lett v. Tunnicliffe, 136 So. 346, 348 (Fla. 1931); Caledonia Na
herson, 75 A.2d 685, 687 (Vt. 1950). 
278 See Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mallett, 136 So. at 349. 
279 See Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mallett, 136 S
280 Caledonia, 75 A.2d at 688; see Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mallett, 136 So. at 349. 
281 See U.C.C. § 3-108(a) (2002) (stating that a promise or order is payable on demand 
if it indicates that it is payable at the will of the holder). 
282 See id. Another way to think about the scenario is as if the bank had given the de-
positor a note for the amount deposited, that is payable on demand. See id. In that sce-
nario, there w
ty would not count against the debt on the note. See id. §§ 3-108, 3-602 (providing that 
an instrument is paid
ument). 
283 See i
able); id. § 3-602. 
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ment, often governed by a promissory note.284 The equivalent right in 
a depositor-bank relationship is for the depositor to bring a claim of 
breach of the bank’s duty under section 4-401.285 
 An example of this scenario may be helpful: if Jim mails a check 
for his mortgage but the mailman steals the check and cashes it, Jim 
has no right to a reduction of his debt to the mortgage company, even 
though a check written to the company was paid out of his account.286 
The mortgagee remains his creditor in the amount of Jim’s most recent 
bill.287 This outcome is consistent with people’s general intuition: the 
company did not receive any payment, so why should Jim be entitled to 
a reduction of his debt?288 Jim, in the typical case, would have an action 
against his bank for paying over a fraudulent indorsement, but this 
does not change the fundamental relationship between Jim and his 
creditor.289 Against his bank, Jim has a right to repayment because the 
payment was not made to the authorized party, and, therefore, as an 
unauthorized payment, Jim’s bank does not have the right to deduct 
the amount from its debt to Jim.290 This hypothetical reinforces the 
idea that the positive payment concept embodied in section 4-401 
should not be varied by agreement.291 If a bank can deduct a charge 
from a depositor’s account only if it is authorized, then Article 4 re-
mains analogous to the regulation of the creditor-debtor relationship 
enefit 
an uthorized charge is to the benefit of the customer.292 
                                                                                                                     
because only a payment that is received by a creditor is to its b
d only an a
2. The Development of the Law Toward Variability and Why It Is 
Mistaken 
 Courts, however, have not given the creditor-debtor concept much 
weight when deciding both facsimile and positive payment cases.293 In-
 
284 See id. § 3-401 (stating that a person is not liable on the instrument unless he or she 
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.C. § 3-602(a) (2002). 
 an item is properly payable if the customer has 
auth t); id. § 3-602(a). 
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291 See id. 
292 Tex. Commerce, 703 F. Supp. at 594; Mallett, 136 So. at 349; U.C.C. § 4-401. 
293 See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wachovia Bank, No. 08-CV-2734, 2010 WL 2777478, at *6 (D. 
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stead, courts have looked at the provisions within the deposit agree-
ment and have sought to hold them enforceable without considering 
r, 
not seem unreasonable because it merely re-
inforces the normal outcome: that the bank always wins.300 Instead, it 
se  
minimizing legal costs.301
                                                                                                                     
the potential legal issues that they raise.294 This lack of consideration is 
perplexing given the language of section 4-103, which states that a bank 
cannot disclaim ordinary care.295 
 One potential reason why courts have been generally predisposed 
to uphold and impose facsimile provisions is because attorneys and 
judges have a mistaken belief that the general principle of the check 
system is that banks always win.296 Therefore, when the court sees a fac-
simile agreement, it is likely to uphold it both as a matter of contract 
law and due to the general understanding that, absent some other fac-
to the bank prevails under the UCC.297 There is some evidence to 
support this argument, as some literature has discussed the power of a 
bank and suggested that the bank is likely to win vis-à-vis its depositor.298 
 This reasoning explains courts’ behavior regarding facsimile 
agreements.299 If attorneys and judges believe that the bank always wins 
in the standard case, then a facsimile agreement or a conditioned posi-
tive payment system does 
ems like banks have attorneys who are representing them well and
 
C. Why the Bank Does Not Always Win: Section 4-103 Was Never Meant to 
Apply to Section 4-401 
 Unfortunately for the development of the law, the theory that the 
bank always prevails is incorrect.302 The standard in the UCC is not that 
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2013] Check Fraud & the UCC's Standard Risk Allocation Scheme 307 
the bank always wins, but rather that the bank always loses unless it can 
show some type of negligence on the part of the drawer.303 This rule 
makes inherent sense in the context of a creditor-debtor relationship 
because, in the case of unavoidable loss (e.g., the scenario discussed 
above in which the mailman steals the check), the creditor has not re-
ceived the benefit of the payment.304 Without the benefit of receiving 
payment, there would be no reason to become a creditor in the first 
lac
ic
of the depositor-bank relationship, then the main question becomes 
                                                                                                                     
p e.305 Thus, absent a showing of negligence, the bank will and 
should always lose because the depositor, as a creditor, should receive a 
benefit when an amount is deducted from the account.306 
 The critical question becomes why Article 4 stipulates that its pro-
visions can be varied so long as the bank does not disclaim its duty of 
ordinary care if a depositor, as a creditor of the bank, should always get 
a benefit when the bank repays some of the debt.307 The answer may be 
that the UCC’s drafters assumed that the legal community would un-
derstand the background of creditor-debtor law, or, more likely, it may 
be a historical anachronism such that the rules governing the collec-
tion of items were included in the same Article as a bank’s duties to its 
depositors.308 Article 4 originated from the ABA Code governing a 
bank’s duties in the collection of the payment of checks.309 The provi-
sions that govern a bank’s duties to its depositors (Article 4, part 4) are 
derived from a common law line of cases that preceded the UCC, 
wh h stated that banks paid off the debt to their depositors by follow-
ing the orders and directions of their depositors, and thus, perhaps the 
drafters of Article 4 believed that courts would defer to this tradition.310 
 If the drafters wrote the UCC with the intention of courts and 
practitioners reading it within the context of the creditor-debtor nature 
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what a bank’s duty of ordinary care should be to its depositors.311 Un-
der section 4-401, a bank can only charge a depositor’s account for 
items that are properly payable.312 Both facsimile agreements and con-
ditioned positive payment agreements allow a bank to change this 
standard to any item that is presented to the bank for payment, drawn 
on the customer’s account.313 If the standard of ordinary care does not 
ensure that the payments are actually at the direction of the creditor, 
then what is ordinary care?314 As discussed below, this question be-
comes a bit of a logical quandary: if a debtor’s duty is to pay its creditor, 
but it is allowed to vary this duty by agreement, what duty actually re-
mains for the debtor to provide with ordinary care?315 In such a sce-
ari
 means that a bank has no obligation 
eca
ers that banks in the ordinary course of business do not examine items 
                     
n o, there seems little left to the relationship that could not be dis-
claimed.316 
 The logical conclusion, from the idea that a bank as a debtor to its 
depositor can deduct an amount from its debt for an item that was not 
authorized by the account holder, is that a bank is allowed to disclaim 
its most important duty to its depositor, the duty to repay.317 Theoreti-
cally, if the bank does not have a strict duty to repay its depositors, there 
is little to a contractual obligation on the part of the bank at all.318 
Banks could accept depositors’ money and grant them a creditor’s right 
with an exception to the depositors’ right to repayment for mistakes 
made by the bank regarding authorization.319 If a payment was not au-
thorized, then the payment does not benefit the creditor.320 This ex-
ception to repayment ultimately
b use the bank no longer must perform its singular duty to repay the 
debt to the creditor’s benefit.321 
 The problem becomes particularly pronounced when one consid-
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that are presented for payment.322 Depending on a particular bank’s 
policy, there is usually a numerical value above which checks are manu-
ally inspected—for example, above $5000—and banks also generally 
hand inspect a certain percentage of all other items presented for pay-
ment.323 But the vast majority of items presented for payment are never 
examined by a bank employee.324 Instead, a bank’s computer process-
ing system reads the check and deducts the applicable amount of 
money from the account number indicated.325 In this context, it is easy 
to see how difficult it is to prevent fraudulent checks from being paid 
and then deducted from the depositor’s account.326 
D. The Solution  Common Law 
is ultimately to repay the deposit when the customer de-
an
: Courts Must Remember That Banks Have a
Duty to Repay Their Depositors as Creditors 
 The solution, therefore, is for courts to remember in these cases 
that banks are not governed only by the provisions of Article 4, but also 
by the common law, which imparts duties to a bank the moment a de-
positor hands over a payment device to a teller or an automated sys-
tem.327 When presented with situations involving positive payment or 
facsimile agreements, courts should recognize that a bank’s duties in 
the collection process are separate and distinct from its duties to its cus-
tomers as depositors.328 In check collection, a bank’s duty of ordinary 
care is to pursue a reasonable method to transfer the check for ultimate 
presentment to the payor bank.329 In comparison, a bank’s duty to its 
customer 
m ds.330 
 Courts should consider the sections of Article 4 that govern the 
bank’s relationship with its customer according to a separate standard, 
taking into account that the main duty of a bank is to repay on demand 
the debt it owes to the depositor.331 Analyzing part 4 of Article 4, which 
governs the relationship between a depositary bank and its customer, 
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separately from the rest of Article 4 with due regard to its history, would 
create an analogous regulation of a bank’s duty to its depositors as to 
the bank’s duty to its credit or debit cardholders.332 These relationships 
between banks and account holders are regulated by the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA) and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 
respectively.333 TILA and EFTA only regulate the relationship between 
an account holder and the issuing bank.334 The relationship between 
the network banks for either the debit or credit network, the issuing 
nk
d with 
di
variance in the current law whereby a bank is not liable in the check 
system for an equivalent action for which it would be liable in the wire 
     
ba , and the merchant are all governed specifically by standard con-
tract law.335 
 Courts should continue to allow the variability of the remaining 
portions of Article 4, that is, parts I, II, and III.336 This proposed alloca-
tion would allow banks to create agreements with each other to pursue 
the most efficient methods in check collection, which is separate from 
the duties that a bank has to its depositors.337 A collecting bank’s only 
duty is to the previous bank in the chain of collection to procee
or nary care to receive final payment of the item; the collecting bank 
has no duty to the person who originally deposited the check.338 
 This new analysis of the relationship between a bank and its de-
positors would not permit variation of whether items are properly pay-
able under section 4-401.339 Instead, the analysis would be analogous to 
Article 4A, governing wire transfers, which does not permit the risk al-
location scheme to be varied by agreement.340 Wire transfers are used 
by similar customers as positive payment systems, presenting an illogical 
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transfer system.341 This variation should be rectified by not allowing 
banks to vary the default provisions of Article 4.342 
 This new analysis is more appropriate than the current situation 
because section 4-103 logically applies to the duties of a collecting 
bank; collecting banks are free to vary the standard rules of check col-
lection and make different agreements with other banks so long as they 
maintain their duty of ordinary care.343 It becomes clearer how much 
more sense this solution makes when compared with how the concept 
of lack of ordinary care interacts with the idea of properly payable.344 
As mentioned above, the fact that a bank cannot disclaim ordinary care 
when varying the UCC and the idea that banks can in fact vary section 
4-401 such that they can charge depositors for unauthorized items re-
sults in a logical quagmire of how to reconcile the notion of not dis-
claiming ordinary care with the duties of a debtor to a creditor.345 
Compared to the applicability of section 4-103 to section 4-401, the ap-
plication of section 4-103 to the collection provisions is more logical— 
banks can vary the default rules of collection so long as the collection 
agreements do not delay collection, and thus do not amount to a lack 
of ordinary care.346 
Conclusion 
 Courts have been willing to enforce agreements that vary section 4-
401 of the Uniform Commercial Code and place the risk of loss entirely 
on depositors rather than the banks that accept forged checks. Due to 
the creditor-debtor nature of the relationship, this willingness is prob-
lematic and should not be supported. Section 4-103 provides that a 
bank can vary the standard provisions within Article 4 so long as it does 
not disclaim ordinary care. In the context of a creditor-debtor relation-
ship, what does ordinary care mean? There are two possible answers to 
this question: either (1) the drafters were looking at deposits in the 
context of the historical relationship, or (2) most of Article 4 is con-
cerned with the collection of checks and part 4 of the Article was added 
to the old bank collection statutes without considering how section 4-
103 would interact with section 4-401. Either explanation leads to the 
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same solution: courts should remember the critical context of the de-
positor-bank relationship when presented with a provision in a deposit 
agreement that varies a default rule governing that relationship. 
Michael Coutu 
